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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS IN OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS
by
Umut Unal
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor
This dissertation raises a number of policy concerns from a macroeconomic
policy point of view and provides additional insights and implications in terms of the
effects of fiscal policy and its macroeconomic effects that have kept the open economy
macroeconomics literature busy since the early 2000s.
The first essay develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
for analyzing the impact of various capital income tax policies in a small open economy
that is populated by households possessing endogenous time preferences. I contribute to
the literature by studying the impacts of: i) anticipated tax shocks under stochastically
growing output, ii) stochastic tax shocks under deterministic output, on a dynamic
general equilibrium framework. With the model's specifications, this is the first attempt
to integrate uncertainty in the study of taxation and welfare. The results suggest that
under certain conditions welfare paradoxes may exist, in the sense that increases in tax
instruments may improve welfare.
The second essay characterizes the dynamic effects of net tax and government
spending shocks on prices, interest rate, GDP and its private components in four OECD
countries using structural vector autoregressive regressions (SVAR) approach. For the
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first time in this literature, I propose a structural decomposition of total net taxes into four
components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social insurance
taxes. The paper provides estimates of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to
innovations in these net tax components. Decompositions of total net tax innovations
show that net tax components have different impacts on economic variables. Moreover,
the size and persistence of these effects vary across countries depending upon the
strength of wealth, substitution, and income effects reflecting the structure of the
economies.
The last essay estimates the wealth effects of housing and stock market wealth
using time-series data for eight developed countries. In estimation I employ the SVAR,
which articulate the dynamic interactions of shocks to housing prices, stock values, and
disposable incomes. The results show that for these countries the initial consumption
response to housing price shocks is greater than to stock market capitalization shocks, but
the long-run consumption response to the latter is more persistent than to the former. My
findings suggest balanced monetary policies for the developments of housing markets
and equity markets.
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CHAPTER I
CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION AND WELFARE UNDER DSGE
FRAMEWORK
I.I. Introduction
“It is often said that nothing is certain in life except death and taxes. While death
is undoubtedly certain, there is, in fact, considerable uncertainty with respect to tax
rates”. 1 As Sialm (2006) points out, there has been a significant fluctuation in marginal
income tax rates in United States from 1913 to 1999 2 which implies that there is tax
policy uncertainty.
This paper is the first attempt to include stochastic taxation in a dynamic general
equilibrium framework with endogenous rates of time preference, even though there are
many studies existing in both finance and public economics literature. For instance,
Stiglitz (1982) discusses the welfare impacts of random taxation. According to Skinner
(1988), “tax policy is often unpredictable because of factors beyond the control of
government”. He shows the considerable variability of tax rates in US during the period
1929-1975. By studying the additional excess burden of uncertain tax policy, he
computes that uncertainty in tax policy led to $12 billion extra burden for the US
economy in 1985. In addition, Hassett and Metcalf (1999) use a model with an uncertain
investment tax credit to study the effects of tax policy uncertainty on aggregate
investment. They find that, under a continuous time random walk, tax policy uncertainty
causes a delay in investment. This result is also in line with the findings of Agliardi
1

Hassett and Metcalf (1999).

2

That is also valid for OECD countries. For more information see OECD tax database.

1

(2001). Yet, by extending Hassett and Metcalf's (1999) model, Bohm and Funke (2000)
demonstrate that the effects of tax policy uncertainty must be very limited because of
various modelling assumptions.
On the other hand, recent literature on fiscal economics points towards the effects
of different types of government spending versus tax shocks on GDP and its components.
Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) investigate the effects of a change in
fiscal policy on private investment using a panel of OECD countries. They find that taxes
do have negative impact on output, as do Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Moreover, the
latter concludes that private consumption increases follow an increase in tax rates. In both
these studies, it is shown that any increase in taxes will crowd out private investment. In
addition, Perotti (2004) points out that the impact of any change in tax policy on GDP
and its components have become weaker over time. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) try to
distinguish the effects of fiscal policy shocks for US economy between 1955-2000.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature by focusing on the
impacts of anticipated tax shocks under stochastically growing output, and stochastic tax
shocks under deterministic output, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with
endogenous rates of time preference. As pointed out above, the empirical studies indicate
that tax rate changes are frequent and, in most cases, future tax changes cannot be
predicted. This basically implies that tax changes can be an element of uncertainty. For
instance, since the 1990s, there has been a tax competition in the sense that countries cut
tax rates to attract investment which makes firms operate in a tax-cut scenario because of
the possibility of further future reductions. Thus, whatever the sign of the tax rate change
is, tax rate uncertainty is an important issue that must be analyzed (Fedele, Panteghini
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and Vergalli, 2009). Or to put it differently, it is important to see how the agents react if
there is an uncertainty about tax levels in the economy. It is worth noting that over the
last two decades, most of the studies in the literature use either real option models to
study the effects of tax rate uncertainty on investment or econometric/numerical
techniques to see the impact and/or international transmission of any shock in an
economy. Here, we deviate from these studies by setting up a stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium model to focus on the welfare effects of various capital tax instruments in a
small open economy populated by infinitely-lived households possessing endogenous
time preference that is in line with Epstein and Hynes (1983). 3 The model also assumes
that the households can borrow or lend freely in the world capital market. Perfectly
competitive firms produce one good that can be used for consumption and investment
which is subject to adjustment costs in the sense that the firm has to pay an installation
cost. We, then simulate the model and show that: (i) under a deterministic setup, a
permanent expected increase in any of capital income tax will lead to a change in welfare
that depends on whether the marginal productivity of capital exceeds or falls short of the
real rate of interest; (ii) when output is stochastically growing, any increase in tax levels
causes a decrease in welfare regardless of where the economy stands; (iii) when there is a
stochastic change in tax levels, the change in welfare will depend on the change in the
type of the capital income tax, in the sense that a stochastic negative change in corporate
income tax and tax on capital gains will lead to an increase in welfare because of the
increase in wealth.

3

For empirical findings, also see Obstfeld (1990).
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The model we present in the next section also predicts the effects of any change in
tax levels on consumption, capital stock, shadow price of capital and the current account.
Unlike most intertemporal equilibrium models, our model leads to non-monotonic
adjustment of the current account in response to various policy changes. This finding
implies that, if adjustment costs are beyond a certain threshold, there will be an initial
decrease in both savings and investment when investment is at its lowest level.
Thereafter, savings will increase parallel to low levels of disinvestment. 4
There are three theoretical papers closely related to our paper in terms of the
questions having light shined on them: Bizer and Judd (1989), Nielsen and Sorensen
(1991) and Karayalcin (1995). Bizer and Judd (1995) made a seminal contribution by
highlighting the uncertainty in tax policy under a dynamic general equilibrium
framework by implementing Markov process. Their model is relatively straightforward
since only two types of taxes (investment tax credit and income tax rate) are included.
To examine the dynamic macroeconomic effects of capital income taxation,
Nielsen and Sorensen (1991) develop a small open economy with perfect mobility of
financial capital as possessing time-additive (exogenous) preference. Although various
forms of capital income taxation are included in the model, the changes in taxes are
deterministic. Therefore, here we depart from Nielsen and Sorensen (1991) in extending
the model by including both endogenous time preference and adding a stochastic
framework. The former is adopted because, if the constant-discount rate does not match
with the parametric world interest rate, a stationary equilibrium does not exist. On the

4

See Karayalcin (1994).
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other hand, if that rate diverges from the parametric world interest rate, the time additive
preferences will cause hysteretic adjustment towards the steady state 5, rendering the
analysis dependent on initial conditions.
Finally, by combining endogenous time preference and adjustment costs,
Karayalcin (1995) builds a model that focuses on the welfare effects of capital tax
instruments in a small open economy. In that framework, because of the adjustment costs,
he ended up with a lower degree of consumption smoothing since agents will no longer
be able to undertake a frictionless adjustment in the capital stock. Another significant
difference is that his study concentrated on unanticipated tax shocks and their welfare
effects. Here, we deviate from Karayalcin (1995) in enhancing the model by involving
both stochastically growing output and stochastic taxation. Also, we differ from all three
papers cited above by incorporating numerical analysis which measures the magnitudes
of effects due to variation in capital income taxes.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets up a model with
stochastically growing output in a small open economy with perfect capital mobility of
financial capital. The setup is one with infinitely-lived households possessing
endogenous rate of time preference and adjustment costs in investment. The effects of
changes in tax policy instruments will be studied in section three and section four
concludes the paper.
I.II. The Model
Consider an economy that produces a single good that may be used for
consumption as well as investment. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms produce in a
5

See Karayalcin (1995), Sen and Turnovsky (1990).
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competitive market. The economy is populated by infinitely-lived households possessing
endogenous time preferences. The number of households are normalized to one without
loss of generality. Government collects taxes by following a balanced budget policy in
the sense that the tax revenue is used to finance the households via transfers.
Households
The welfare of households is taken to depend on consumption of the good in the
market. Also, the households receive the wage wt by inelastically supplying one unit of
labor services per unit of time. We denote the world interest rate by r , the interest
income tax rate by t r and the household's net assets by at , that is the sum of the value of
domestic equity and the value of foreign assets. Thus, r (1− t r )at is the net interest
income. According to equations (1)-(3) below, the consumer is maximizes expected
discounted lifetime welfare subject to the constraint that the current increase in nonhuman wealth is equal to the sum of after tax income from wealth, from labor and from
government transfers minus consumption.
We also adopt the endogenous rate of time preference structure proposed by
Epstein and Hynes (1983). Other than the time-additive models, in this setting, time
preference imply a well-defined long-run target level. Therefore, lifetime welfare, U , is
maximized over consumption path, C , by
∞

U (C ) = − Et ∑exp(− zt )
t =0

1
1 + (1 − t r )r

(1)

subject to
zt +1 − zt = u (ct ) − r ,

(2)

6

at +1 − at = (1 − t r )rat + wt − ct − tt ,

(3)

z0 = 0,

(4)

where u (c) > 0 is required to be a strictly increasing and strictly concave felicity function
in the sense that u ′ > 0 and u ′′ < 0 and tt is the lump-sum government transfer.
Following Obstfeld (1990) and Epstein and Hynes (1983), one can argue that the
lifetime welfare functional U deviates from the time-additive utility functionals by its
recursivity. As is widely known, additivity implies that the marginal rate of substitution
between times t1 and t 2 is independent of consumption at any t ≠ t1 , t 2 . However, here,
recursivity allows this marginal rate of substitution to be independent of consumption
before t1 but not after t 2 in order to make future consumption weakly sepereable from
past consumption levels. Therefore, the variable rate of time preference Ω at time s has
the following form:
−1

∞
 t

Ω s = ∑exp − ∑u (cs )  .

 s =v  s =v

(5)

Ω at time s is the following function of the utility functional U (C )

Ω(φs ) = −φs−1

(6)

φs = U ( s C )

(7)

and

where U represents positive discounting of future consumption and φs denotes aggregate
future consumption (or lifetime welfare at time s). It should be noted that the rate of time
preference is not constant as will be the case in the additive model. On the other hand, as

7

in the steady state, if the consumption path is globally constant, ct +1 = ct for all t and

ct = c . In this case, the rate of time preference is given by
Ω(φ ) = u (c)

(8)

where upper-bars describe long-run equilibrium.
Even though there is significant dispute on whether impatience to consume has to
increase or decrease as current consumption goes up, since it is assumed that u ′(c) > 0 , in
our framework increasing marginal impatience will take place as in Lucas and Stokey
(1984) who basically emphasize that a kind of diminishing private returns to saving is
required to have local stability. Therefore, the felicity function is specialized to:
u (ct ) = lnct + ω

(9)

where ω stands for a parameter to measure generalized time preference.
By using equations (1-4) and (9), the standard solution of the life-time welfare
maximization problem yields:
Et (ct +1 ) = [(1 − t r )r + 1 − Ω(φt )]ct .

(10)

On the other hand, by differentiating (1) with respect to time, we can obtain the
dynamics of lifetime welfare:
Et (φt +1 ) = 1 + φt (u (ct ) + 1),

(11)

Firms
Competitive firms employ capital, kt , and labor to produce the single good
which is used for both consumption and investment. The production function is
f (kt ) = θ ty ktα

(12)

8

where θ ty is the aggregate productivity shock which follows a stochastic autoregressive
process 6 with the disturbance term ε t assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ y2 i.e. ε t : N (0, σ y2 ) .
We assume that the firm finances a fraction (1 − ε ) of new investment by debt
issues and the remaining fraction, ε , by retained earnings as:
btc = (1 − ε )kt

(13)

btc+1 − btc = (1 − ε )(kt +1 − kt )

(14)

and

After corporate income tax is applied, the remaining profits are distributed as
dividends to equity holders. Therefore, before personal tax, total dividends, π t , are:

π t = [ f (k t ) − wt − rbtc − T ](1 − t c ) + bt +1 − bt − (1 − t l )it

(15)

where tc and tl stand for the corporate income tax rate and the rate of investment tax
credit respectively and T denotes the adjustment cost. If the firm changes its capital, it is
subject to adjustment costs in the sense that the firm has to pay a deadweight installation
cost other than the actual cost is . The installation cost 7 must be an increasing function of
i in relation to k , which should have the following properties:

T (0) = 0, T ′ > 0,

6

2T ′ + (i/k )T ′′ > 0.

(16)

The details can be seen in the next section.

7

Note that adjustment cost depends on gross investment rather than net investment. Yet, since we ignore
depreciation, those terms can be treated as same.

9

In

our

framework,

the

installation

cost

function

is

specialized

to

T (it /k t ) = ( χ/2)(it /k t ) so that, in order to increase the capital stock by i units, the
representative firm needs to pay it [1 + ( χ/2)(it /kt )] units of output.
Foreign bonds, bt f , and corporate bonds, btc , are treated to be perfect substitutes.
Thus, they have to pay the same expected after tax return. If Vt denotes the market value
of outstanding equity, t r stands for the personal interest income tax rate and t g is the
capital gains tax rate, for all t the arbitrage condition therefore will be:
r (1 − t r ) =

πt
Vt

+

(1 − t g )[Et (Vt +1 ) − Vt ]
Vt

(17)

where the term on the left-hand side is the after tax income on foreign bonds, whereas the
right-hand side delineates the after tax equity return, consisting of current yield and
capital gains. The market value of equity at time zero will therefore be:
∞

Vs = Es ∑θ
s =1

−1
g( s )

 θg
π s 
 θ g + rθ r






s −1

(18)

where θ i = 1 − t j , j = c, g , r . Firms choose to maximize the present discounted value of
Vs subject to the constraint is = k s +1 − k s . The solution yields,
Es (qs +1 ) =

q s ( rθ r + θ g )

qs =

θg

−

 is +1 2 ' is +1  
θc 
'
) T(
) 
 Es ( f (k s +1 )) − r (1 − ε ) + Es (
θg 
k s +1  
 k s +1

is 2 ' is 
1 
(ε − tl ) + θ c (T + ( ) T ( )
θg 
ks
ks 

ws = f (k s ) − f ' (k s )k s

(19)

(20)
(21)
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where the shadow price of capital at time s is given by qs . Following Hayashi (1982),
we can define qs as the ratio of market value of firm's equity to the replacement cost of
capital. Thus, qs in equaation (20) can be considered as a variant of Tobin's Q. Equation
(21) is the equilibrium condition for the labor market while the law of motion for the
shadow price of capital is given by equation (19).
Equation (20) can be used to denote the rate of investment, it /kt , as the following
function of qt :
it = kt +1 − kt = kt γ (qt )

(22)

where γ ' (qt ) = (θ g /θ c ) χ > 0. Equation (22) simply expresses investment as an increasing
function of the shadow value of capital, qt . Here, it should be noted that both q and i
are independent of the consumption and saving decisions of the households.
The Current Account
In this part, by recalling the government's balanced budget policy, in order to
acquire the dynamics of the current account, let us use equations (3), (15)-(22) and
at = bt f + qt kt + btc . We therefore obtain
bt f+1 − bt f = rbt f + f (kt ) − it (1 + T ) − ct

(23)

which states that the increase in foreign asset holdings equals the difference between the
sum of output and interest earnings of the representative household less the sum of
consumption and investment expenditures.

11

Characterization of the Equilibrium
It is convenient to describe the economy's steady state before characterizing the
equilibrium behavior of our model. The market clearance and optimality conditions will
give the long-run relations in this economy. We can easily obtain the steady state value of
the shadow price of capital, q , by using equations (19) and (22), and imposing the
stationarity conditions. At steady state

q=

ε − tl
, q = q * (t g , tl ), q1* > 0,q2* < 0,
θg

(24)

where, in order to guarantee a positive value of q , it is assumed that the replacement cost
of capital is higher than the debt issue per unit of capital, 1 − ε < 1 − tl , which indicates
that the firm does not overfinance its investment. 8
Similarly, it yields 9

θ (ε − tl ) 
*
*
*
*
*
f ′(k ) = r (1 − ε ) + r
 k = k (t g , tc , t r , tl ), k1 < 0,k 2 < 0,k3 > 0,k 4 > 0,
θ
θ
c g


f

r b = c − f (k ) b = b* (t g , tc , t r , tl ),
'

u (c) = rθ r , c = c* (t r ), c* < 0,

 1
 rθ r

φ = −

b1* > 0,b2* > 0,b3* < 0,b4* < 0,

(25)

(26)
(27)

'

, φ = φ * (t r ), φ * < 0


(28)

8

For more information, see Nielsen and Sorensen (1991).

9

The derivatives can be seen in appendix.
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Thus, one can obtain the steady state values of (q , k , b , c , φ ) by using
equations (24)-(28).
Since we do have the steady state values of all the variables, it is convenient to
follow Schmitt-Grohe (2005) and solve our system by perturbation methods. Before
doing so, let us briefly discuss this method. The first-order perturbation method is similar
to linearization of the Euler equations around steady state. Essentially, with the help of
the techniques for forward looking rational expectations, the linear model is solved. One
of the main requirements we need to satisfy is the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) condition: that
is the number of the roots larger than 1 in modulus has to match the number of forward
looking variables in the model. 10 Or, to put it differently, for the system to be locally
saddlepath stable, it has to be the case that three of the eigenvalues have to be larger than
1 in modulus, since the system has three predetermined (backward looking) (k , θ y , b) and
three control (foreward looking) variables (c, φ , q ) . It is straightforward to show that this
is the case here.
I.III. Various Fiscal Shocks and Their Effects on Economy
In this section, we examine the outcomes of the model under different types of
shocks. Before moving onto that part, although actual tax systems differ, let us define the
case where t g = t r and tc = tl = 0 ; in other words, an economy under a uniform,
comprehensive income tax, no investment subsidies and with fully integrated corporation
taxes. Therefore, in this case we will end up with f ′(k ) = r equivalence confirming the

10

For details, see Judd (1998), Sims (2002), Judd (1996) Kim and Kim (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004) and Collard and Juillard (2001).
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Schanz-Haig-Simons result which argues for the neutrality of income tax with respect to
investment.
Yet, in a real world tax system, q and k will be affected by tax factors because
generally neither the investment tax credit is equal to zero, and nor is the effective tax
rate on interest earnings less than the tax rate on accrued capital gains. Thus, there occurs
a distortionary wedge between the world interest rate and the marginal productivity of
capital in the home country. Suppose, initially, that the former exceeds the latter. In this
case, any policy that shrinks the home capital stock will, by increasing its marginal
productivity, reduce the distortion and raise lifetime welfare. Thus, in order both to
analyze our model more concretely and to investigate the outcomes of different scenarios
more profoundly, two countries, Canada and Sweden, are included. Among our countries,
Canada represents the f ′(k ) < r case, whereas Sweden embodies f ′(k ) > r case given
the initial values.
Deterministic Tax Shocks and Their Effects on Welfare
Since the welfare effect is going to play an important role in the next section, in
order to be able to compare and contrast, we will start out considering the effects of an
expected permanent increase in the corporate income tax rate. As seen in equation (25),
this will reduce the long-run capital stock of the economy and therefore the effect on
consumption on impact will be positive. However, since the long-run foreign asset
holdings increase, there is expected to be an increase in savings as well, which causes a
negative effect on consumption on impact. The net effect is determined by the inital
condition of the economy i.e whether f ′(k ) > r or f ′(k ) < r . Following Karayalcin
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(1995), we can infer that φ on impact yields the present discounted value of the future
felicity stream as of time t = 0 . Thus, the difference between φ on impact and initial φ
is a measure of the welfare effects of the policies under consideration. To summarize, if,
initially f ′(k ) > r , we can expect a drop in consumption on impact so will lifetime
welfare because the decline in capital stock caused by the rise in tc will accentuate the
distortion by increasing the marginal product of capital.
Figures (1.1)-(1.4) show the simulation results for an increase in tc and t g both
for Canada and Sweden. We find that under an expected permanent increase in the
corporate income tax or tax on capital gains, lifetime welfare increases in Canada,
whereas Sweden will suffer from the rise in taxes due to the reasons mentioned above. To
place the discussion in a familiar setting, let us examine the Canadian, f ′(k ) < r , case.
An expected permanent rise in the corporate income tax 11 will cause an increase in
welfare. This is mainly because of the required long-run decrease in the domestic capital
stock and the long-run increase in foreign asset holdings. If the interest earned on foreign
bonds, r , is less than the long-run effect of the decline in the capital stock on income
(i.e. f ′(k ) < r ) , the decrease in the capital stock caused by the rise in tc will reduce the

distortion and increase lifetime welfare. 12
Let us turn to the effects of an increase in the investment tax credit. As seen in
equation (26), there will be a decrease in long-run foreign asset holding and a rise on the
11

Same result is valid for the tax on capital gains.

12

On the other hand, if f ′( k ) > r initially holds, an increase in
which will accentuate the distortion and reduce lifetime welfare.
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tc will give rise to a fall in capital stock

long-run capital stock because of the decline in the replacement cost of capital for both
countries. Thus, for Canada, the distortion will be accentuated and there will be a
decrease in welfare on impact as seen in figures (1.5) and (1.6). On the other hand, since
f ′(k ) > r holds for Sweden, the lifetime welfare will increase because of the reduction in

the distortion.
Finally, we will consider the effects of a rise in the tax rate on interest income, t r .
Such a policy will make ownership of real capital more attractive relative to the
ownership of bonds. Thus, there is expected to be an increase in the long-run level of
capital and a decrease in the steady state level of foreign asset holdings. It should also be
noted that the increase in k will take place until the equity price returns to its initial
level. 13 As can be seen in figure (1.8), lifetime welfare increases in Sweden because of
the rise in capital stock which will reduce the distortion. On the other hand, as the
increase in tax rate discussed above indicate, if initially f ′(k ) < r holds, the same policy
will accentuate the distortion and reduce lifetime welfare.
Mixed Shocks and The Model
In this section 14, we begin analyzing the model under a stochastic productivity
shock and considering that model as the benchmark. Thereafter, the shocks will be mixed
in the sense that the stochastic productivity shock will be kept while the anticipated

13

The details can be seen in the next section.

14

It should be noted that the same stochastic productivity shock remains throughout this part although its
level is kept small in order to avoid any outweighing effect in the sense that productivity shock never
dominates the tax shock. Thus, it must be considering while evaluating the results.
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permanent tax shocks will be added to see how the model reacts if agents began
expecting higher tax rates.
In a stochastic framework, since the model needs to be made stationary around a
steady state, permanent shocks cannot be placed. Moreover, shocks can only hit the
system today and the expectation of future shocks has to be zero. However, by adding a
latent shock variable (which has a normal distribution with zero mean), ε t , it is possible
to make the effect of the shock disperse slowly throughout the economy. Here, basically,

ε t is going to affect the model's true exogenous variable θ ty that is itself an AR(1)
process (Griffoli, 2007).

θ ty = ρθ ty−1 + ε t

(29)

Our results suggest that, under stochastically growing output any increase in tax
level will worsen the economy and reduce welfare regardless of whether f ′(k )  r . For
both countries, the results are in tables (1.1) and (1.2) and the impulse response analyses
can be seen in figures (1.11)-(1.18).
We first discuss the simulation results when there is only a stochastic productivity
shock. Figure (1.9) shows the results for Canada and figure (1.10) for Sweden. For both
countries, our indicators show a similar trend in adjustment path when hit by a stochastic
productivity shock. A 1% standard error increase in ε t causes an increase in capital as
well as consumption in the short run. The former is caused by the increase in the
marginal product of capital whereas the latter is a result of an increase in output. On the
other hand, there will be an increase in the rate of return on equity that leads to an
immediate jump in the price of equity q, which will stimulate investment by causing a
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current account deficit. Since c jumps on impact as well, domestic absorption will
increase which deteriorates the current account deficit in the short run. However, in the
long run, investment starts to decrease along with the decrease in q which causes an
improvement in current account balance. In addition, consumption adjusts much faster
than the investment level. Thus, the accentuating effect of consumption on current
account will die out, or, to put it differently, the current account balance will improve in
the long-run by adjusting non-monotonically.
Next, as discussed above, we will mix the stochastic productivity shock and
anticipated permanent tax shocks. In analyzing table 1.1, let us start out considering the
effects of a foreseen rise in the corporate income tax rate under stochastic productivity
shocks. Suppose the government announces that a corporate tax will be implemented at
time t = 20 . Anticipating a future reduction in the rate of return on equity, investors will
decrease their demand for equity which will cause a drop in the price of equity q on
impact along with a process of capital decumulation. It should be noted that, considering
equation (22), as q remains below its long-run level along the adjustment path,
investment will decrease. In the short-run, the decline in the rate of investment along with
the reduction in consumption will improve current account balance. Yet, in the long-run,
investment will increase to reach its long-run value in addition to a decline in savings that
leads to a deterioration in the current account balance as in both figure (1.11) and (1.12).
Therefore, the current account will adjust non-monotonically.
Under stochastic productivity shock, a foreseen increase in capital gains tax rate,
t g , will increase long-run foreign asset holdings and reduce the long-run domestic capital
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stock as well as lead to a rise in the long-run equity price q . Notice that the long-run
changes in k and q , by putting opposing pressures on impact, determine the short-run
adjustment of q . Although there is a jump in q on impact, there will be follow a process
of capital decumulation, or, to put it differently, a decrease in investment occurs because
of the increase in t g which clearly outweighs the jump in q . 15 Afterwards, the capital
stock will adjust to its new long-run level by giving rise to an increase in real investment.
On the other hand, consumption drops on impact by strengthening the improving effects
of decreasing investment on current account. Thus, current account will have an upward
trend until the increasing effects of higher savings die out. Afterwards, the current
account surplus starts to decrease along with an increase in investment and adjusts to its
new steady-state level (see figures 1.13 and 1.14).
Conversely, under stochastic productivity shocks, an anticipated future increase in
tl has an expansionary long-run effect because the investment tax credit decreases the
effective price of new capital goods relative to initial capital. Therefore, the long-run
level of k will increase, whereas there will be a decline in the steady state level of
foreign asset holdings. As in the case of an increase in t g , there will be opposing
pressures on the equity price q . On the other hand, because of the anticipated reduction
in the effective price of new capital goods, a foreseen future tax credit is expansionary
from the time it is expected until the time it takes effect. As is well-known, a higher rate
of investment tax credit makes new capital cheaper relative to initial capital. Thus, there
will be an increase in the domestic capital stock up until the implementation of new tax
15

See equation (35) in appendix.
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policy. To summarize, analyzing figures (1.15) and (1.16), we can say that capital stock
per capita is increasing from the time of announcement of the new tax policy until the
time it takes effect, whereas a contraction occurs after the new tax policy is introduced.
On the other hand, as opposed to the case of an increase in t g , we see an immediate jump
in consumption on impact which will aggravate the domestic absorption, worsening the
current account deficit. As the economy starts to increase its holdings of foreign assets
(right after implementing the new tax levels), it has to run a current account surplus
which implies a nonmonotonic adjustment of the current account balance.
Finally, let us examine the effects of a foreseen rise in the personal interest
income tax rate, t r , under a stochastic productivity shock. Note that an anticipated rise in
the tax rate on interest income will lead to a higher demand for equity since there will be
a reduction in the rate of return on foreign bonds. The excess stock demand for equity
will be eliminated by an immediate jump in the price of q on impact. As a result, real
investment will rise as q remains above its long-run level. Yet, as capital intensity rises
we see that its marginal product declines, up until q and the rate of investment go back to
their long-run values. On the other hand, since a rise in t r will reduce the long-run utility
target, households will reduce their long-run consumption. As a consequence, current
account balance will deteriorate because of the rise in both investment and consumption
levels. However, consumption will reach its steady state value sooner, and therefore, the
accentuating effects of higher consumption on current account will disappear in parallel
to the reduction in investment. Thus, there again occurs a non-monotonic adjustment of
current account balance.

20

Last but not least, we will highlight the impacts of any changes in tax levels under
stochastically growing output on welfare. Since the logic is, mutatis mutandis, same for
the rest of the exercises, we will examine the effects of an increase in the tax rate on
capital gains and investment tax credit. As seen in table 1.2, an increase in tax rate on
capital gains will lead to a decrase in the long-run domestic capital stock and an increase
in foreign asset holdings. Because of the reasons discussed in the previous part of the
chapter, this change in tax level is expected to give rise to a reduction in lifetime welfare
if, initially, f ′(k ) > r . On the other hand, there will be an increase in welfare if f ′(k ) < r
initially holds. However, here, for both of the countries, consumption drops on impact, so
will lifetime welfare which is because of the uncertainty and the risk averse utility
function. 16 When the effects of output shocks propogate over time, a risk averse utility
function will lead to a cost called the cost of uncertainty. That is mainly why we ended up
with the following: It is clear from table 1.1 and 1.2 that on impact consumption levels
(so will lifetime welfare) are lower than the benchmark cases. On the other hand, an
increase in the investment tax credit has an expansionary long-run effect on domestic
capital stock and a contractionary long-run effect on foreign asset holdings. Therefore, a
reduction in life-time welfare is expected for Canada whereas a rise in life-time welfare is
anticipated for Sweden. However, in this case, although there is a jump on impact, lifetime welfare reduces for both of the countries -when compared to the benchmarkregardless of where the economy stands. For instance, the on impact value of φ is -14.75
and -16.92 for Canada and Sweden respectively (see table 1.1). Yet, as a response to a
16

Risk aversion simply implies that individuals strictly prefer to take the expected value of a lottery to than
the lottery itself.
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change in various type of tax instruments, in none of the cases, we are able to have a
higher φ on impact value. Thus, under stochastically growing output, a welfare paradox
does not exist.
The Stochastic Tax Shocks and Their Effects
In this part, we will put the model to work by considering the effects of stochastic
tax shocks. 17 With having the following structure, we assume that the economy has been
experiencing a deterministic tax structure and expects it to last forever. Then, we change
the tax policy by introducing some uncertainty but keeping the mean tax rate constant
after an initial decrease in tax levels. For this purpose, we have δ 's such that δ ti = θ j e

zt

where j = c, g , l , r and zt is the tax shock which follows a stochastic autoregressive
process zt = µzt −1 + ζ t with the disturbance term ζ t assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ z2 i.e. ζ t : N (0, σ z2 ) . As in the case of stochastic
productivity shock discussed above, similarly, here we do shock the system today by
dispersing its effect slowly throughout the economy. It is worth noting that an increase in

δ ti on impact means a reduction in tax levels. Thus, throughout this part, the shocks
hitting the system today are negative tax shocks.
Let us start out by considering the effects of a stochastic change in the corporation
tax. On impact, this will increase dividends and the rate of return on equity. The
expectations of capital gains will rise and there will be an immediate jump in the price of
equity, q , leads to an immediate increase in investment which will cause a current
17

Throughout this part, productivity parameter is normalized to one without loss of generality. In other
words, productivity is constant.
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account deficit. 18 Since c jumps on impact, we will end up with an increase in domestic
absorption which accentuates the current account deficit in the short run. Towards steady
state, this process reverses and continues until the rate of return on foreign bonds equal
the rate of return on equity. In other words, right after an initial jump in q , investment
starts to decrease along with the shrink in q which causes an improve on current account
balance. Moreover, consumption adjusts much quicker, or, to put it differently, the
accentuating effect of higher consumption on current account will disappear. Therefore,
in the long-run, that will improve the current account balance as well, besides the shrink
in investment.
Next, consider the effects of a stochastic change in the capital gains tax. As
opposed to the previous case, here, what we see is an initial drop in q along with an
increase in domestic capital stock. We can explain this situation by combining19
equations (18) and (19). Depending on the corresponding equation, a decrease in capital
gains tax rate, θ g , will lead to a decrease in q on impact. However, although we expect
(and also see) an increase in investment level, here, q declines. This situation can be
explained by equation (22) which basically indicates that the change in θ g outweighs the
decline in q and therefore, even though q drops on impact, there is an increase in the
invesment level. In the short-run, an increase in the rate of investment along with an
increase in consumption will deteriorate current account balance. On the other hand, in
18

It should also be noted in figure 1.19 that
state value.

19

k rises/declines as soon as q exceeds/falls behind its steady

The corresponding equation can be seen in appendix.
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the long-run, the accentuating effect of c on current account will disappear in addition to
the decrease in investment that leads to an improve in current account balance as seen in
figure 1.20.
Conversely, a stochastic change in invesment tax credit causes a jump in q on
impact. Yet, here, investment is decreasing in the short-run which can be explained by
equation (20). It is straightforward in the equation that we will end up a decrease in
investment level at least in the short-run because the change in tl has a dominating effect
on the increase in q . Therefore, k goes up in the medium-run. However, since the shock
on tl dies out over time, towards steady state the increase in q offsets the change in
investment tax credit which will give rise to an increase in k (so will investment). The
decrease in investment, along with declining consumption, will improve current account
balance in the short-run. However, in the long-run, consumption will adjust before
domestic capital stock. Thus, the improving effect of higher savings on current account
will disappear in conjuction with the increase in investment level causing a deterioration
in current account balance. Here, again, this implies a non-monotonic adjustment of the
current account (see figure 1.21).
Finally, let us consider the effects of a stochastic change in the tax rate on
personal interest income. It should be noted that, initially, the rate of return on foreign
bonds will increase. On impact, there will be a decrease on demand for equity, which will
be absorbed by an immediate drop in the price of equity which increases the yield on it.
In the medium run, the investment will decrease caused by the reduction in domestic
capital stock. Therefore, the marginal productivity of capital will decrease up until the
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equity price, q , and the investment level will reach their initial levels in the long-run. On
the other hand, since there is a drop in consumption on impact and a decrease in the rate
of investment in the short run, the current account balance will improve. However, again,
that process reverses in the long-run, indicating a deterioration in the current account
balance before it reaches its long-run level, or, to put it differently, an implication of a
non-monotonic adjustment of the current account.
Next, we will briefly point out the welfare impacts of stochastic tax changes. As
seen from figures (1.19) to (1.22), while a stochastic change in corporate income tax and
the tax rate on capital gains cause an increase in consumption on impact (so will welfare),
a stochastic change in investment tax credit and the tax rate on personal interest income
lead to a drop in welfare. Here, since long run values do not change, we need to provide
an alternative explanation. As known, wealth is roughly equal to qk . Thus, an increase in
wealth level will give rise to an increase in consumption level which will also cause an
increase in welfare. For instance, it is obvious from figure (1.19) that, as a response to a
stochastic corporation tax shock, both k and most of the time q remains above their
steady-state level that makes individuals wealthier and leads to a rise in consumption. On
the other hand, the opposite holds for a stochastic interest income tax shock. As a
response to a capital gains tax shock, while k stays above its long-run level because of
the reasons explained above, q is below its steady state level. Here we can conclude that
the increase in domestic capital stock, k , outweighs the decline in q . Thus, consumption
increases since there is an increase in wealth level. 20

20

Again, the opposite holds for a stochastic investment tax credit shock.
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I.4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the dynamic macroeconomic effects of different
capital income taxation methods in a model of a small open economy with endogenous
recursive time preferences and adjustment costs in investment where perfectly
competitive firms produce one good that can be used for consumption and investment.
We have shown the adjustment paths of consumption, lifetime welfare, equity prices,
current account and investment in response to various tax shocks. Our results suggest that
welfare paradoxes may exist only under deterministic output and anticipated tax shocks.
Unlike most intertemporal equilibrium models, our model leads to non-monotonic
adjustment of the current account in response to various policy changes.
Our model can be generalized in numerous ways. For instance, it is worthwhile to
generalize to see the outcomes of any change in tax policy or, in other words, how the tax
policy might be adjusted in an economy. It may also be interesting to enhance our
analysis by allowing the households to supply their labor elastically to study the impact
of tax policy changes on wages and consumption. Our model can also be extended to a
two-country framework to analyze the international transmission of shocks.
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Table 1.1. Foreseen Tax Shocks under Stochastically Growing Output and Their Impacts
(Sweden)

A rise in
tc

0.4587

-48.07

0.9285

25.98

-61.78

0.4405

-60.46

tg

0.4587

-48.07

0.9352

26.18

-61.96

0.4054

-84.17

tl

0.4587

-48.07

0.9

27.29

-62.98

0.496

-22.93

tr

0.4585

-49.01

0.9285
26.95
-62.67
Benchmark for Sweden
-48.07 0.9285
26.39
-62.15

0.4713

-40.76

0.5047

-16.92

0.4587

Note: + above a variable indicates on impact value for the parameter.

Table 1.2. Foreseen Tax Shocks under Stochastically Growing Output and Their Impacts
(Canada)

A rise in
tc
tg
tl
tr

0.4617
0.4617
0.4617
0.4615
0.4617

-36.76
0.7971
23.58
-36.76
0.8092
23.54
-36.76
0.7681
24.95
-37.3
0.7971
24.33
Benchmark for Canada
-36.76
0.7971
23.94

-59.4
-59.36
-60.73
-60.14

0.4408
0.4122
0.4855
0.4822

-46.07
-58.79
-26.2
-28.25

-59.76

0.5112

-14.75

Note: + above a variable indicates on impact value for the parameter.
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Figure 1.1. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in corporate income tax for Canada

Figure 1.2. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in capital gains tax for Canada

Figure 1.3. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in corporate income tax for Sweden

Figure 1.4. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in capital gains tax for Sweden
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Figure 1.5. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in investment tax credit for Canada

Figure 1.6. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in investment tax credit for Sweden

Figure 1.7. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in interest income tax for Canada

Figure 1.8. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in interest income tax for Sweden
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Figure 1.9. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic productivity shock for Canada.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.

Figure 1.10. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic productivity shock for Sweden.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 1.11. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tc under stochastically growing output for
Canada.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.

Figure 1.12. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tc under stochastically growing output for
Sweden.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.
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Figure 1.13. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tg under stochastically growing output for
Canada.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.

Figure 1.14. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tg under stochastically growing output for
Sweden.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.
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Figure 1.15. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tl under stochastically growing output for
Canada.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.

Figure 1.16. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tl under stochastically growing output for
Sweden.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.
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Figure 1.17. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tr under stochastically growing output for
Canada.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.

Figure 1.18. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tr under stochastically growing output for
Sweden.

Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean
trajectory.
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Figure 1.19. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic corporation tax shock.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.

Figure 1.20. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic capital gains tax shock.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.
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Figure 1.21. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic investment tax credit shock.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.

Figure 1.22. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current
account and welfare following a stochastic interest income tax shock.

Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.
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CHAPTER II
RETHINKING THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON
MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES
II.I. Introduction
A common approach in both empirical and theoretical studies on fiscal policy
shocks is to evaluate the response of macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous changes in
the fiscal policy variables. From a theoretical point of view, the impacts of discretionary
fiscal policy on the economy hinge on a number of key assumptions. For instance, in
examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy, the presence or absence of
forward-looking behavior plays a crucial role in that if agents do not look forward,
expected future changes do not have any effect on current-period decisions. Agents with
rational expectations, on the other hand, do look forward in anticipation of future changes
in key macroeconomic variables.
The empirical evidence, however, does not provide a clear picture of the effects of
fiscal policy. In particular, even though the most recent and standard strand of the
literature, which started with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), shows positive short-term
output multipliers resulting from government expenditure increases and tax cuts, the
estimated size and duration of these effects vary across studies. In fact, the magnitude of
the multiplier may depend on the specification and/or sample period employed.
Interestingly, there is even evidence of negative government spending multipliers for
Australia, Canada and the UK for some sub-sample periods (Perotti, 2004).
There is a substantial body of literature devoted to the effects of fiscal policy on
key macroeconomic indicators using Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models.
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For instance, Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) investigated the effects
of a change in fiscal policy on private investment using a panel of OECD countries. Their
finding that increases in taxes have a negative impact on output is parallel to the findings
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 21 In addition, the latter concludes that private
consumption increases following an increase in tax rates.
Both of these studies demonstrate that any increase in taxes will reduce private
investment. Further, Perotti (2004) points out that the impact of any change in tax policy
on GDP and its components becomes weaker over time. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) try
to distinguish the effects of fiscal policy shocks for the US economy between 1955 and
2000. They envisage three different scenarios: a deficit-financed spending increase, a
balanced budget spending increase, and a deficit-financed tax cut. They conclude that
among these three scenarios the deficit-financed tax cut is the most efficient one to help
raise the gross domestic product. More recently, by employing a new database, Burriel et
al. (2010) analyze the effect of fiscal policy for the US economy and Euro area as a
whole. They find that GDP and inflation increase in response to government spending
shocks even though the output multipliers are very similar and steadily increasing after
2000, possibly because of the “global saving glut,” in both areas.
Alternatively, Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2009) and Ramey (2007) report a
decrease in unemployment in response to a positive spending shock. On the other hand, a
few studies consider the reaction of the real wage following an increase in government

21

For a detailed discussion, see also Fatas and Mihov (2001), Tenhofen and Wollf (2007), De Castro and
De Cos (2008), Mertens and Ravn (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010).
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spending. Among those, Pappa (2009) documents an increase whereas Burnside et al.
(2004) report a decrease in the real wage in response to an expansionary fiscal policy.
Some of the stylized facts above appear to contradict either neo-classical theory,
real business cycle (RBC) model or the Keynesian approach. In other words, the sign and
magnitude of the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates often
offers opposite conclusions. For instance, following a positive government spending
shock, New Keynesian theory tends to predict an increase in output, real wages and
interest rate and a decrease in consumption and private investment. Yet in RBC models,
the expansionary fiscal policy will lead to a decrease in real wages and an increase in
private investment.
Additionally, economic theory suggests that different forms of taxation have
different impacts in macroeconomic activity. For instance, Barro (1990) points out that
while non-productive expenditures financed by a distortionary tax have an
unambiguously negative growth effect, non-distortionary tax-financed increases in
productive expenditures are predicted to have a positive impact upon the growth rate.
Baxter and King (1993) point out that financing government spending with lump-sum
taxes and distortionary taxes have different effects on economy. Gordon et al. (2004 and
2004a) analyze the impact on revenue and costs of a substantial change in fiscal policy,
such as the effects of switching from capital income taxation to consumption-based tax
system. They both find that consumption taxes and income taxes have different impacts
on saving and investment decisions.
In view of these discrepancies, the central message of this paper is that different
tax groups have different effects on macroeconomic aggregates, depending on the
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underlying cause of the tax increase. Our results suggest that analyzing the fiscal policy
by decomposing total net taxes and examining their effect on the aggregate economy
provide a more accurate picture than treating total net taxes as the fiscal policy variable.
To this end, under the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification scheme, a five-variable
VAR model, which includes total government spending, total net taxes, GDP, a measure
of inflation and the interest rate is used as a benchmark for Canada, France, the UK and
the United States. Thereafter, I propose a structural decomposition of total net taxes into
four components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social
insurance taxes. The paper provides estimates of the responses of macroeconomic
aggregates to innovations in different tax groups by replacing total net taxes with each tax
components separately. In a further step, the responses of the GDP components, private
investment and consumption, to a shock to each tax component will be examined.
Decompositions of total net tax innovations will help us assess the
macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy shocks for four major economies with
different economic structures. In this context, corporate income tax shocks, for instance,
will have a very different impact on macroeconomic indicators than an indirect tax
innovation. It is, therefore, important that we understand the extent to which increases in
net taxes are driven by one shock or another, before concerning ourselves possible policy
responses.
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1)
decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components have different
impacts on economic variables; 2) the size and persistence of these effects vary across
countries depending upon the strength of wealth, substitution, and income effects
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reflecting the structure of the economies; 3) positive tax multipliers reported in previous
studies are found only for the corporate income tax in the US, Canada, and France and for
the social security tax in the US; 4) while we find that private investment is crowded out
both by taxation and government spending in the UK and the US as consistent with the
neo-classical model, our results for France and partially for Canada, indicate that there
are opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private investment in line with
Keynesian theory; and 5) private consumption is crowded in by government spending for
all countries except the UK and crowded out by taxation in all countries except France.
While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line with
neo-classical theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two focuses on the
identification of the structural shocks, specification and data describing. Section three
investigates the impacts of the shocks identified in Section two on macroeconomic
aggregates of four countries. Section four provides some concluding remarks
I.II. Econometric Methodology and Data:
The Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Denoting the
vector of endogenous variables by Xt and the vector of reduced form residuals by Ut , the
reduced form VAR can be represented as

(1)

Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + Ut

where Xt is a N x 1 vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a N x N matrix lag
polynomial, and Ut is a N x 1 vector of reduced-form innovations which are assumed to

be independently and identically distributed with covariance matrix equal to the identity
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matrix. In our benchmark specification Xt and Ut consist of the following variables:
g

y

p

Xt = [g t , Tt , yt , pt , rt ]′ and Ut = [ut , uTt , ut , ut , urt ]′.

I start by expressing the reduced form innovations of the government spending
g

and net taxes equations as linear combinations of the structural fiscal shocks et and eTt to

these variables and the innovations of the other reduced form equations of the VAR,
y

p

namely: ut , ut and uit . This leads to the following formal representation of the reduced
form residuals:

y

p

g y

g p

g

uTt = αTy ut + αTp ut + αTi urt + βTg et + eTt
g

g

g

g

ut = αy ut + αp ut + αi urt + βT eTt + et

(2)
(3)

As mentioned by Perotti (2004), in this framework, the coefficients αij measure

both the automatic response of fiscal variable i to the macroeconomic variable j and the

systematic discretionary response of fiscal variable i to the macroeconomic variable j.

The coefficients βij capture the random discretionary fiscal policy shocks to fiscal

policies; these are the “structural” fiscal shocks. It should also be noted that we avoid
using the Cholesky decomposition method. Regardless of the order of fiscal variables,
Cholesky orthogonalization will not provide consistent estimates of the structural shocks
if, as is the case here, the αkj ’s are different from zero. 22

Direct evidence on the conduct of fiscal policy suggests the existence of decision

lags in the sense that it is not possible to learn about a GDP shock, decide what fiscal
measures to take in response, pass these measures through the legislature and implement
them within three months as pointed out by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Thus, the
22

For details, see Perotti (2004) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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discretionary change in variable i in response to a change in variable j is zero. As a
g

consequence, in quarterly data the systematic discretionary component of uTt and ut will
be zero: the coefficients αij ’s will only reflect the automatic response to economic

activity. Because the reduced form residuals are correlated with the et ’s, it is not possible

to estimate the αij ’s by ordinary least squares.

We, therefore, need to construct the elasticities of fiscal variable i to the

macroeconomic variable j to compute cyclically adjusted reduced form fiscal policy
shocks:

y

p

g y

g p

g

uT,CA
= uTt − αTy ut − αTp ut − αTi urt = βTg et + eTt
t
g,CA

ut

g

g

g

g

= ut − αy ut − αp ut − αi urt = βT eTt + et

(4)
(5)

The next step of the estimation procedure is to decide the relative ordering of the
fiscal variables to identify the structural shocks to those. While imposing βTg = 0
g

postulates the priority of tax decisions, βT can be set to zero if government spending

decisions are deemed to come first. It might be hard to find plausible arguments that fully
justify any of these orderings. In the baseline specification the latter assumption is
employed. The reverse ordering does not affect the results given the low correlation
between the two reduced form fiscal shocks.
Consequently, it is possible to estimate βTg by OLS from the following equations:
g,CA

ut

g

= et

(7)

g

uT,CA
= βTg et + eTt
t

(8)
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Finally, the coefficients of the equations for the macroeconomic variables will be
estimated recursively by means of instrumental variables regressions. With respect to real
GDP, the following equation will be employed:
y

y g

y

y

ut = γg ut + γT uTt + et

(9)

g

g

using eTt and et as instruments for uTt and ut respectively. Likewise, the price equation
p

p g

p

p y

p

ut = γg ut + γT uTt + γy ut + et
g

(10)

y

can be estimated by using eTt , et and et as instruments. Finally, the interest rate equation
g

y

p

p

urt = γrg ut + γrT uTt + γry ut + γrp ut + et

(11)

p

can be estimated accordingly once et is recovered. After the reduced form of the VAR

and all the coefficients are estimated, we can proceed to estimate the impulse responses
using the structural moving average representation of the VAR.
The Data
Our sample comprises four countries: Canada, France, the United States and the
United Kingdom. The benchmark specification of the VAR includes quarterly data on
government spending (g t ), net taxes (Tt ) and GDP (yt ) all in real terms 23; the GDP

deflator (pt ), and the Treasury bill rate (rt ). 24 The variable Tt is defined as public
revenues net of transfers, whereas g t includes both public consumption and public
investment. All the variables, except the interest rate, are log-transformed. Since the
availability of the quarterly fiscal variables, particularly for the net tax components, is a
binding constraint, the sample runs from 1960:1 to 2000:4 for the US, 1961:1 to 2000:4
23

Following the standard literature, the GDP deflator is employed to obtain the corresponding real values.

24

The data source defines the Treasury bill rate as the rate at which short-term securities are issued or
traded in the market.
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for the UK and 1970:1 to 2000:4 for Canada and France. All variables have been
seasonally adjusted by the original sources. For all countries, the Treasury bill rate and
the GDP deflator data are obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics
database. The rest of the data have been taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for
the US and OECD World Economic Outlook for the other countries.
The Specification
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS and the number of lags was set according to the
information provided by likelihood ratio (LR) test, the Akaike, Schwarz and HannanQuinn information criteria and the final prediction error in general. 25
In order to obtain the response of macroeconomic aggregates to various tax policy
innovations, the VAR specification described in the previous section is estimated. Each
model comprises of the following variables: government expenditures (g t ), tax revenue

(TT ), measured by the tax revenue of the ith tax group), the GDP (yt ), the GDP deflator
(pt ) and the Treasury bill rate (rt ). After the benchmark model (with total net taxes and

government spending is estimated, we estimate the responses of macroeconomic
aggregates to innovations in different tax groups by replacing total net taxes with each tax
components separately. In a further step, we estimate a number of other specifications
where GDP is substituted in turn by its private components.

Most of the time, the information criteria suggest different results. For instance, while estimating
the model with corporate income taxes for the US, Hannan Quinn and Schwarz criteria suggest 2 lags,
whereas final prediction error and Akaike information criteria suggest 6 lags. Here, I choose 6 lags,
since 2 lags is often regarded as too short to capture enough economic interpretations among variables
for a model with quarterly data as also mentioned in Kim and Roubini (2008). However, as a robustness
check, the model is also estimated with the alternative lags and led to very similar conclusions. For an
extensive survey of model selection criteria, see also Lutkepohl (1991).
25
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Following the leading studies in the literature 26, the elasticities of taxes to GDP is
constructed from data provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development. 27 We also assume that, in quarterly data, the contemporaneous elasticity of
government purchases with respect to output is zero. Given that interest payments on
government debt are excluded from the definitions of government net taxes and spending,
g

the semi-elasticities of these two variables with respect to interest rate, αr and αTr ,

innovations are set to zero. 28 Finally, following Tenhofen et al. (2006), the GDP deflator
elasticity is simply the real GDP elasticity of the fiscal variable less one. 29 Table 2.1
provides an overview of the quarterly elasticities in use.
II.III. Empirical Results
I compute the effects of various types of fiscal policy shocks on the basis of the
estimated SVAR model. The figures depict the results displaying the impulse responses
to a 1% exogenous increase in the corresponding fiscal variable. In all cases, impulse
responses are reported for five years and the 90% confidence bands, corresponding to the
5th and 95th percentiles of the responses, have been obtained by bootstrapping with 200
replications. In this respect, it is worth noting that, the choice of the confidence interval
width is wider than that of the 68% literature standard.
26

For instance, Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Perotti (2007).

27

The calculations are based on Van den Noord (2000), Daude et al (2010).

This is again one of the standard assumptions in the literature. See Perotti (2004), Castro and De Cos
(2008), Tenhofen et al. (2006).
28

29

The authors mainly follow the assumption that “the response of the nominal fiscal variable is the
same to both price and real GDP movements, which is, in turn, given by the real GDP elasticity of the
real fiscal variable. Provided nominal prices do not influence real GDP, the GDP deflator elasticity is
the real GDP elasticity of the fiscal variable less 1”.
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Figures (2.1)-(2.4) display the impulse responses of the various macroeconomic
indicators to a total net tax shock. Specifically, while the response of output in France is
statistically insignificant, GDP falls on impact in response to net taxes innovations in the
US, Canada and the United Kingdom. While the response of GDP in the European
countries and Canada remains significant almost for a year, the significant decline of
GDP in the US 30 appears to be more persistent, which is in line with the results of Burriel
et al. (2010). Moreover, it should be noted that, in the UK, Canada and France, GDP
tends to increase after ten quarters which is consistent with the findings of Perotti
(2004). 31
In France, private consumption is consistently crowded in even though the
increase becomes significant after two years which is in line with a Keynesian model.
Furthermore, we find that private consumption is crowded out by taxation in the US,
Canada and the UK as is consistent with neo-classical theory. Here, it should also be
noted that, due to the increase in taxes, as consumers reduce their consumption, the
national savings will increase lowering the real interest rate in these countries in the
medium-run.

30

Here, it is worth recalling that I have been working on 0.90 probability which indicates that the
bands in this study are broader. Therefore, most of the results for US turn out to be significant in 0.68
probability (which is the common probability measure in the literature).
31

Perotti (2004) finds positive tax multipliers for Australia, the UK and West Germany. According to
him, it is because of the smaller output elasticities of net taxes. However, here, I did not identify any
positive impact effect. What we are ending up with is that GDP tends to increase after three years in
France and almost four years in UK which turns out to be rather counter-intuitive. Yet, even though
the standard literature studies the effects of fiscal policy by employing conventional VARs, it should be
noted that the forecasting limitations of this methodology for such long horizons advise against
drawing conclusions from this result (De Castro and De Cos, 2008).

47

As regards investment, figures (2.1)-(2.4) and (2.5)-(2.8) point to the following
results: In the standard Keynesian approach, an increase in spending may yield either an
increase or a decrease in investment depending on the relative strength of the effects of
the increase in output and the increase in the interest rate; but, in either case, increases in
spending and taxes have opposite effects on investment as mentioned in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). While this is the case in our results for France and partially for Canada,
we did not reach the same conclusion for the US 32 and the United Kingdom.
Figures (2.5)-(2.8) shows the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to an
increase in government spending. The impact response of GDP is positive 33 and
significant in all countries except the United Kingdom. While the size of the response is
similar in the US, Canada and France, the shape of the impulse response of output is
slightly different, in the sense that, after an initial rise, GDP starts declining and after
about 10 quarters, it slightly rises again in France. In Canada, after an initial increase,
there is a decrease in output, whereas in the US the increase in output is persistent. In the
UK, the response of GDP is insignificantly negative which is consistent with the results
of Perotti (2004) for this country.
In addition, the behavior of private consumption largely mimics that of GDP: it
basically increases on impact in the US, Canada and France but decreases in the United
Kingdom. While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in
line with neo-classical theory.
32

This is, again, supporting the results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).

33

For the US, this is in line with the positive response estimated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2009), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Fatas and Mihov (2001).
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Government spending shocks have positive effects on the interest rate in three
countries (Canada, France and the UK) and essentially no impact effect in the United
States. 34 It is useful to note here that, the former result can be reconciled both with a neoclassical and a Keynesian model.
Figures (2.9)-(2.12) present the effects of a shock to social security contributions
on macroeconomic indicators. As is widely known, social security taxes are levied on
labor as a payroll tax. A priori, the impact response of output will, therefore, depend on
two effects: the substitution effect and the income effect.
Social security tax innovations will lead to a decrease in tax-payer’s after tax
reward for each extra hour worked, lowering the cost of leisure. Thus, via the substitution
effect (SE), the individual will be willing to work less in response to lower reward. On
the other hand, a decrease in the real wage will reduce household lifetime earnings and,
thus, human wealth. So, households, via the income effect (IE), will not be able to afford
additional leisure and, as a result, will supply more labor. The relative magnitude of the
two effects depends on the circumstances such as the elasticities of labor supply and
demand. Hence, the hours worked may increase, decrease or remain the same after the
tax innovation.
It is seen from figure (2.9) that in the US, IE dominates SE yielding a significant
increase in output on impact. It is also worth noting that the behavior of private
investment and private consumption mimic that of GDP: it typically increases on impact
in this country. For Canada, France and the UK, higher social security taxes decline
output, which decreases significantly and remains significant for five years in France. As
34

Note that the interest rate response in the US and UK are insignificant for the entire period.
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far as GDP components are concerned, investment and private consumption responses, in
general, mimic the GDP’s one. Some slight differences may be observed though,
particularly in the short-run behavior. The price level in Canada decreases significantly
after four quarters and remains significant for five years due to the decrease in demand in
response to a social security tax innovation in this country. However, the opposite
behavior is observed in France in the sense that, after a significant decline in the shortrun, prices insignificantly rise in the medium-run due to the 0.4 % decrease in output in
response to a shock to social security contributions.
The impact effect of the social security tax innovation on the interest rate is
positive in the US due to the increase in money demand and private investment, whereas
the estimated impact effect on the interest rate is insignificant for the rest of the countries.
Figures (2.13)-(2.16) present the effects of a shock to indirect taxes on
macroeconomic indicators. The response of each component is typically similar across
countries, hence summarizing their shapes is not difficult. Over the whole sample, the
impact response is negative for GDP in all countries. Because they lower the purchasing
power of real after-tax wages, indirect taxes lead to a strong incentive to curtail
investment as seen in figures. On the other hand, since the indirect taxes can be defined
as the sales taxes, taxes on goods and services, there is a decrease in consumption in
response to an increase in tax levels. Indirect tax innovations also lead to a decrease in
the price level due to lower demand. Note that, with the partial exception of Canada and
France (where we have seen an insignificant increase in the interest rate for three
quarters), there is a decline in the interest rate on impact in response to an indirect tax
innovation. This can be explained by the decrease in income and investment levels.
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Figures (2.17)-(2.20) depict the responses of the endogenous variables to an
income tax innovation. Here, two opposing effects need to be taken into account. First, an
increase in income taxes reduces the household wealth by increasing the present value of
household tax liabilities. Thus, consumption decreases while saving, interest rate and
labor supply increases. However, the rise in hours worked will lead to a decline in real
wages, therefore, investment and output increase. This is the wealth effect. Second, the
same policy will slow down economic activity by decreasing output. Because the money
demand depends on income, the decline in output decreases the interest rate which
partially crowds in private investment. The degree of crowding in will hinge on the
sensitivity of private investment to income and the interest rate. Yet, the final effect of
the contraction will be a decline in consumption, investment and output. This is the
output effect. Hence, the overall effect on macroeconomic indicators will depend on these
two effects.
For the US, Canada and the UK, the output effect dominates the wealth effect and
therefore the impact response of consumption, investment and output are negative. For
France, although the impact response of output and investment are negative, the output
persistently increases, and there is an insignificant increase in investment after the third
quarter. On the other hand, it should be noted that consumption significantly rises in
Canada and France. There are several ways to explain this. 35 For instance, Linnemann
(2006) applies a non-seperable utility function in consumption and leisure in a RBC setup
in which consumption and leisure are substitutes. The negative wealth effect of the fiscal
35

Another plausible explanation takes place when habit formation is included in any model. For more
details, see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Bouakez and Rebei (2007). Alternatively, Corsetti,
Meier and Muller (2009) modeled a spending reversal effect and ended up with the same conclusion.
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contraction raises hours worked which decreases leisure. The marginal utility of
consumption, therefore, increases. In order to lessen the negative wealth effect,
individuals are willing to work more and to consume more which will lead to an increase
in consumption.
Figures (2.21)-(2.24) display the responses of the macroeconomic indicators to a
corporate income tax innovation. The impulse responses show a significant positive
response of GDP on impact for all countries except the United Kingdom, which can,
again, be explained by the negative wealth effect and output effect. Here, the wealth
effect dominates the income effect for Canada, France and the United States. Moreover, it
should be further noted that the increase in capital income tax will be reflected in the
prices. It will lower the purchasing power of real after-tax wages and therefore the
positive impact on output caused by the wealth effect will be accentuated. As a result, an
increase in corporate income tax will lead to a positive impact effect on GDP and all the
private components of gross domestic product. Thus, after an increase on impact, private
consumption and private investment will fall in the medium and the long-run in the
United States. However, the significant positive impact on investment persists for almost
three years in Canada whereas there is an insignificant increase in consumption. Here, it
should be noted that our results are in line with and Arin and Koray (2006) and HeppkeFalk et al. (2006). 36 It is also worth mentioning that corporate income tax innovations

The former study is done for Germany whereas the latter is for Canada. Both of the papers ended up
with an increase in GDP in response to a corporate income tax innovation. According to Heppke-Falk
et al. (2002), this might result from some sort of reverse causality stemming from identification
difficulties due to problems with exogenous elasticities. However, this is not the case in this study.
Although I am confident that the presented elasticities accurately capture the automatic stabilizers, as a
36
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have positive effects on impact on the nominal interest rate in three countries (Canada,
France and the US) due to the increase in income and investment on impact; and
essentially an insignificant impact effect in the United Kingdom.
Robustness Checks
I performed a variety of robustness checks to our 5 variable VAR specification.
First of all, a different ordering of the expenditure variables when identifying the shocks
was employed. So far, government spending was ordered first. Yet, there is no basis for
choosing one orthogonalization over the other as mentioned in Perotti (2004).
Nevertheless, all the responses were re-estimated under the assumption that government
spending was ordered after taxes. The results obtained with this alternative specification
were very close to those of the benchmark model.
As mentioned in Perotti (2004), the implementation of lags of fiscal policy could
undermine the predictability of the estimated fiscal policy shocks. It might require some
time for fiscal policy changes to be implemented and according to the author, the private
sector might anticipate these changes before the econometrician. However, it is shown in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that allowing for anticipations of fiscal policy does not
substantially alter the results. Nonetheless, in order to check the robustness of the
baseline results, I tried some alternative lag lengths. Even though there were some minor
differences in point estimates, the results were generally involved in the 68% bandwidth
of baseline estimates.

robustness check, I re-estimate the SVAR assuming slightly different elasticities, without any
substantive change of the results.
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In addition, although we were confident that the elasticities we used accurately
capture the working of automatic stabilizers, we reassessed the sensitivity of the results
was assessed by varying those values. First, following Perotti (2004), I assumed a -0.5
price elasticity of government spending. The results were, again, very close to the
benchmark model. The differences were minimal in the sense that there was a slight
change on point estimates of the impulse responses.
Finally, I evaluated the sensitivity of the results to different values for the output
and price elasticity of various tax instruments. It is shown in Cohen and Folette (1999)
that there has only been a slight fluctuation in tax elasticities over time in the United
States. Therefore, to see whether there is a significant change in impulse responses, the
benchmark elasticities were replaced with their 10% bandwidth values. The results
obtained with these alternative elasticities were, again, very close to those of the
benchmark model. There were only a few percentage points change in estimates of the
impulse responses. 37
II.IV. Conclusion
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of total net tax and government
spending shocks on GDP, prices and interest rates in four OECD countries using a
structural Vector Autoregression approach with the Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
identification scheme. Moreover, we propose a structural decomposition of net taxes into
four components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social
insurance taxes. Our results suggest that analyzing the fiscal policy by decomposing net

37

The results are available upon request.

54

taxes and examining their effect on the aggregate economy provide a more accurate
picture than treating net taxes as the fiscal policy variable.
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1)
Decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components are found to
have different impacts on economic variables; 2) The size and persistence of these effects
vary across countries depending on different effects (i.e. negative wealth and output
effects, substitution effect and income effect) resulting from the structure of these
economies; 3) The positive tax multipliers reported in previous studies are found only for
corporate income tax in the US, Canada and France and for social security tax in the US;
4) As regards macro theories, on the one hand, we find that private investment is crowded
out both by taxation and government spending in the UK and the US as is consistent with
the neo-classical model. On the other hand, our results for France and partially for
Canada indicate that there are opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private
investment that are in line with Keynesian theory; 5) Private consumption is crowded in
by government spending for all countries except the UK, and crowded out by taxation in
all countries except France. While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model,
the latter is in line with neo-classical theory.
My analysis sheds light on the interpretation of positive net tax multipliers found
in the existing literature. Decompositions of net tax innovations will help us better assess
the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy shocks and, it is, therefore, important
that we understand the extent to which increases in net taxes are driven by one shock or
another.
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The findings in this paper also indicate that existing approaches to modeling fiscal
policy shocks have to be re-thought. First, the results suggest that the usefulness of the
existing macroeconomic applied work built on the assumption of “total” tax changes may
be unclear. In examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks, it is seen
from our results that the traditional priority on net tax shocks may be misleading. Instead,
more attention needs to be paid to different tax policy instruments.
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Table 2.1. Exogenous Elasticities
𝜶𝒕𝒄
𝒚
𝜶𝒕𝒊
𝒚
𝒕𝒔
𝜶𝒚
𝜶𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅
𝒚
𝜶𝑻𝒚
𝒈
𝜶𝒚
𝜶𝒕𝒄
𝒑
𝜶𝒕𝒊
𝒑
𝜶𝒕𝒔
𝒑
𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅
𝜶𝒑
𝜶𝑻𝒑
𝒈
𝜶𝒑
𝜶𝒕𝒄
𝒄
𝜶𝒕𝒊
𝒄
𝜶𝒕𝒔
𝒄
𝜶𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅
𝒄
𝜶𝑻𝒄
𝒈
𝜶𝒄
𝜶𝒕𝒄
𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝜶𝒕𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝜶𝒕𝒔
𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝜶𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅
𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝜶𝑻𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒈
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗

United States
1.8
0.6
0.6
0.9
1.1

Canada
1
1.2
0.9
0.7
1

France
1.8
0.6
0.5
0.7
1

United Kingdom
0.6
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.1

0

0

0

0

0.8
-0.4
-0.4
-0.4
-0.1

0
0.2
-0.1
-0.3
0

0.8
-0.4
-0.5
-0.3
0

-0.4
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1

-1
1.44
0.48
0.48
0.72
0.88
0
0.36
0.12
0.12
0.18
0.22
0

-1
0.75
0.9
0.675
0.525
0.75
0
0.25
0.3
0.225
0.175
0.25
0

-1
1.35
0.45
0.975
0.525
0.75
0
0.45
0.15
0.125
0.175
0.25
0

-1
0.48
1.12
0.96
0.88
0.88
0
0.12
0.28
0.24
0.22
0.22
0

𝑇: total net tax
𝑡𝑐 : corporate income tax
𝑡𝑖 : income tax
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑 : indirect tax
𝑡𝑠 : social security tax
𝑖𝑛𝑣: private investment
c: private consumption
𝑔: government spending (public consumption + public investment)
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Figure 2.1. Effects of total net tax innovations in the US
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Figure 2.2. Effects of total net tax innovations in Canada
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Figure 2.3. Effects of total net tax innovations in France
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Figure 2.4. Effects of total net tax innovations in the United Kingdom
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Figure 2.5. Effects of government spending shocks in the US
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Figure 2.6. Effects of government spending shocks in Canada
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Figure 2.7. Effects of government spending shocks in France
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Figure 2.8. Effects of government spending shocks in the United Kingdom
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Figure 2.9. Effects of social security tax innovations in the US
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Figure 2.10. Effects of social security tax innovations in Canada
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Figure 2.11. Effects of social security tax innovations in France
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Figure 2.12. Effects of social security tax innovations in the United Kingdom
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Figure 2.13. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the US
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Figure 2.14. Effects of indirect tax innovations in Canada
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Figure 2.15. Effects of indirect tax innovations in France
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Figure 2.16. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the United Kingdom
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Figure 2.17. Effects of income tax innovations in the US
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Figure 2.18. Effects of income tax innovations in Canada
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Figure 2.19. Effects of income tax innovations in France
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Figure 2.20. Effects of income tax innovations in the United Kingdom
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Figure 2.21. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the US
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Figure 2.22. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in Canada
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Figure 2.23. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in France
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Figure 2.24. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the United Kingdom
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CHAPTER III
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE HOUSING AND
STOCK WEALTH EFFECTS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
III.I. Introduction
The wealth effect, defined as the change in consumption expenditure induced by
an exogenous change in wealth, has profound implications for measurement, diagnosis,
and forecast of economic activity. For countries including the United States, consumption
expenditure comprises the bulk of gross domestic product. The analysis of wealth effects
thus has garnered attention from market practitioners, policy makers, and academic
researchers. There are various components of wealth, thus various wealth effects
associated with each of them. Yet a large body of literature examines and compares the
magnitude of wealth effects from housing and stock market wealth, presumably two of
the most significant components of wealth for households in developed countries.
Several reasons exist for us to expect a larger wealth effect coming out of housing
than out of stock market wealth. First, the volatility of stock markets is much higher than
that of housing markets. 38 Ceteris paribus, with higher volatility, gains and losses are less
permanent, and households may accordingly exhibit a smaller propensity to consume out
of stock wealth. Secondly, housing wealth is more evenly distributed among households
than is stock wealth. For that reason, even if a household responds in the same way to
both wealth shocks, in aggregate we may still observe a larger magnitude for housing
wealth. Finally, in most economies, housing assets can be easily pledged as collateral to
borrow funds, through mortgages or home equity loans. The same is less the case for
38

See Figure 3.1 and 3.2 for demonstration of this point for countries in our sample.
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stock assets. The increased use of homes as collateral has strengthened the positive effect
of rising housing wealth on consumption as well as on the rest of the economy via
household borrowing the “financial accelerator” effect (Aoki et al., 2002; Cardarelli et
al., 2008).
Yet a couple of factors point to the opposite direction. First, as Poterba (2000)
points out, the rise of house prices increases the implicit “user cost” of living in a house,
which may undercut the boost to nonhousing consumption induced by rising wealth due
to higher house value. Secondly, housing wealth is measured less precisely, which may
lead a household's reaction to wealth change more lukewarm. Finally, transaction costs
related to housing eat into a larger percentage of the housing value appreciation,
discouraging homeowners from cashing out the increased equity. Thus which set of
factors dominate the other is an empirical question.
We re-examine the housing and stock wealth effects by employing the vector
autoregression (VAR) framework which incorporates the dynamic, interactive structure
of variables with each other. Using macro time series for a group of developed countries,
we estimate the VAR model with specified structural error terms. The model stipulates
that the shocks specific to housing wealth precede those specific to stock markets and to
personal income, and that the shocks specific to stock markets precede those to personal
income. We shall discuss the justification of this recursive ordering after presenting the
empirical specification, but we note here that the results obtained with other orderings are
very similar.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: for all the countries in our sample
except Australia, we find a larger initial wealth effect of housing than that of stock
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wealth. The on impact value of consumption to a 10% housing wealth shock ranges from

0.60% (Finland) to 6.42% (Sweden). Yet the long-run effects on consumption from
housing and stock wealth vary considerably across countries. Despite the greater initial
housing wealth effects, however, over time stock market wealth effects catch up and are
mostly persistent, whereas housing wealth effects level off and may decline eventually.
Our results suggest that, for monetary policy purposes, it would be oversimplifying to
emphasize the immediate, higher impact on consumption from housing markets.
Policymakers have to keep an open eye on the long-run, more persistent impact from
equity markets.
Regarding the relative magnitude of wealth effects of housing and of stock
wealth, empirical evidence is mixed. Previous works have found a larger wealth effect for
housing from macro-level aggregate data for the US Benjamin et al., 2004; Case et al.,
2005; Carroll et al., 2011), and from micro-level survey data for the US (Bostic et al.,
2009), and for Spain (Bover, 2005). From these works, the marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) from housing wealth is around 0.03-0.1, while that from financial wealth
is around 0.02-0.08. However, Dvornak and Kohler (2007) find the opposite for
Australia.
Fewer studies have compared both wealth effects from a cross-country
perspective. Indeed, as a result of cultural, institutional, and market-related differences, a
cross-country comparison might shed light on what may be the driving force behind the
differences in wealth effects. Slacalek (2009, Figure 3.1) shows that there is a great deal
of heterogeneity in MPC between countries. He incorporates the sluggishness of
consumption in estimating MPC in a two-step empirical procedure. For the 16 countries
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in his sample, some countries (such as the US and the UK) have substantially larger
housing wealth effect than financial wealth effect while the rest (such as Canada and
Japan) do not, although these estimates are imprecise. Ludwig and Slok (2004) find a
significantly positive relationship between stock prices and consumption for OECD
countries in a pooled mean group analysis, but the relationship is insignificant between
house prices and consumption. Edison and Slok (2002) focus on the stock wealth effects
for eight countries and find that the wealth effect of the information technology stock
market sector is smaller than that of other sectors.
As regards methodology, a strand of literature has used sophisticated models other
than VAR in estimating wealth effects. Some studies have invoked panel data techniques
in their estimation (Dvornak and Kohler, 2007; Slacalek, 2009). More closely related to
our VAR approach is error-correction models that aim to capture long-run equilibrium
effects. Case et al. (2005) employ an error-correction model in which only consumption
and income have equilibrium errors while housing and stock wealth do not. Benjamin et
al. (2004) carefully examines unit-root and co-integration issues in the US aggregate data
(and differ from Case et al. (2005) in terms of sources and measurements) and arrive at
the same conclusion. Ludwig and Slok (2004) and Cardarelli et al. (2008, Table 3.6)
expand the accommodation of equilibrium errors to the housing and stock price variables,
while still maintaining that consumption is the sole dependent variable responsive to
changes in other variables. The closest in methodology to our paper is Edison and Slok
(2002), though their research question, their employed variables and their Cholesky
ordering are different.
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Were cointegration an issue, our VAR model could be revised into the form of
vector error-correction model (VECM), which would allow for equilibrium errors of the
kind assumed by the aforementioned literature. Carroll et al. (2011) argue against the use
of cointegrating/VECM models in estimating wealth effects, for neither theory nor
evidence implies the existence of a stable cointegrating vector. Edison and Slok (2002)
caution against the underlying restrictive assumptions and the demand for large sample
size associated with cointegration estimation, even though all of the countries in their
sample have one cointegration vector. For our data set, statistical tests indicate the
cointegration is not a serious concern for the majority of countries.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the exact
empirical specification we use under the structural VAR framework. Section three
presents data. Section four discusses estimation results, and section five concludes.
III.II. Econometric Methodology and Data
The simplest specification for estimating various wealth effects takes the form
C t = α + β h H t + β s S t + β y Yt + ε t

(1)

where Ct stands for consumption of goods and services, H t for housing wealth, S t for
stock wealth, and Yt for personal disposable income. Such a specification can be derived
from the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH) consumption theories, as is
shown in Benjamin et al. (2004), Dvornak and Kohler (2007), and other studies. As such,
estimated coefficients of β h and β s measure the MPC out of housing wealth, and of
stock wealth, respectively.
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We extend the content contained in (1) into the VAR framework. One substantial
advantage of the VAR is to bring forth the dynamic structure between variables. The
reduced-form VAR is specified by the following equation:
K

Yt = B 0 + ∑B k Yt − k + U t

(2)

k =1

where Yt is the vector of variables ( H t , S t , Yt , C t ) , B k is the matrix of coefficients for
the k -th lag of Yt , and U t is the vector of reduced form innovations. The value of K ,
the number of lags included in (2), is to be determined by the Akaike Information Criteria
(AIC) and the Final Prediction Error (FPE).
It is well known that a reduced form VAR like (2) does not allow correlations
among variables to be interpreted casually (see, e.g., Stock and Watson 2001). We need a
structural VAR representation with “identifying assumptions” for that purpose:
K

A(I − ∑B k Lk )Yt = AB 0 + AU t = AB 0 + Be t

(3)

k =1

where the vector of structural shocks e t : N (0, I 4 ) and E [e t e' s ] = 0 for all s ≠ t . The
matrix A describes the contemporaneous relation between the variables and the reduced
form residuals U t . The matrix B specifies the linear relation between the orthogonal
structural shocks and the reduced form residuals (Heppke-Falk et al., 2010). One version
of the so-called Cholesky restrictions to achieve identification on the system is that A is
a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal, and B a triangular matrix.
By adopting this version of Cholesky restrictions, we assume that the components
of Yt enter in the order of ( H t , S t , Yt , C t ) . This, coupled with the lower triangular matrix
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A , implies that the current shock to the housing wealth H t precedes all other

contemporaneous shocks, the shock to Yt is affected by contemporaneous shocks to H t
and S t , and the shock to Ct is affected by contemporaneous shocks to all the rest.
Our justification of the recursive ordering of shocks in the model, especially the
contemporaneous housing shock being exogenous to other shocks, draws on recent
literature on housing, business cycles, and the macro economy. Leamer (2007) argues
that the housing sector cycle is one of the most important precursors of the US business
cycle. He demonstrates that in the US, eight out of ten recessions are preceded by
substantial problems in housing, and the residential investment contribution to the US
recessions and recoveries (measured in the year before the business cycle peaks and in
the subsequent two years) is substantial. Ghent and Owyang (2010) find no consistent
statistical relationship between local housing and local business cycles by examining the
Metropolitan Statistical Areas data for the US cities. Yet, they also find that national
housing building permits are a leading indicator for local employment. Helbling and
Terrones (2003, Figure 2.1) show that, even though both housing and equity prices have
generally coincided or overlapped with recessions, half of all housing price busts in the
post-war period overlapped with equity price crashes, while only one-third of all equity
price busts overlapped with housing price busts. Additionally, during 1970–2002, the
negative output effects associated with housing price busts were about twice as large as
those of equity price busts. 39
39

Still, to guard against the possibility that our results hinge critically on this particular Choleski ordering,
we also experiment with other alternative orderings. The results obtained with these alternative orderings
are very similar.
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The Data
We use quarterly data with different time coverage for the following countries:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden,
and Switzerland. 40 The data include following variables: housing price index, stock
market capitalization, consumption expenditure, and household disposable income. We
obtain the stock market capitalization from Thomson Reuters Datastream as the measure
of stock wealth. Consumption is the measure of private final consumption expenditure as
is defined in the System of National Account used by OECD, including goods and
services. 41
Conceptually, a natural candidate for measuring housing wealth is home value.
Practically, we can obtain the value of real estate owned by households only for the
United States. For other countries, the relevant data available is the housing price index,
and following the practice of existing literature in this field, we use it as a proxy for
housing wealth for these countries. 42 Yet by using housing prices we fail to pick up the
change in the size or quality of the housing capital stock per capita caused by the change
in housing prices. However, Cardarelli et al. (2008) argue that monetary policy now
40

Table 3.5 summarizes the time coverage as well as the number of observations for analysis for each
country in our data. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries,
quarterly house price index is available only for the countries in our sample, plus New Zealand. However,
disposable income (or industrial production as its proxy) is not available for New Zealand. Therefore we do
not include New Zealand in our analysis. Ludwig and Slok (2004) include more countries than ours due to
the fact that they interpolate quarterly housing prices via annual observations.

41

The consumption measure includes both durable and non-durable components. Mehra (2001) points out
that the total consumption is indeed the variable of interest in estimation of the long-term consumptionwealth relationship.

42

Exceptions exist. Case et al. (2005) adjust the housing price index by the homeownership rate and the
number of households for a country. Slacalek (2009) constructs a measure of housing wealth from a
combination of first and secondary data sources.
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transmits more through the price of houses than through residential investments. Thus,
omitting the change in the housing capital stock due to residential investments may not be
as damaging as it sounds.
That being said, for the US, both housing value and housing price index are
available. We compare the results of estimated impulse response functions by separately
employing these two data series for the US, and find quantitatively small differences
between these two. In particular, for the US, the comparison between the values of
impulse response functions for housing and for stock value does not change, no matter
which data series we use for the housing value.
All variables are adjusted to real terms according to the respective Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for each country. Except for the housing price index, all variables are
on a per capita basis. If not already so in the original data, they are seasonally adjusted by
the X12-ARIMA method. Finally, we use the natural logarithm of these variables in
estimation, for it would be inappropriate to put housing price indexes with other values
on the same footing in levels. Accordingly, our interpretation of the estimates would be in
elasticities, rather than in marginal propenstity to consume. Later we convert estimates of
elasticities back into MPC for comparison with the existing literature.
If VAR contains non-stationary variables, VECM is needed to specify a linear
combination of integrated variables that is stationary. We employ the maximum
eigenvalue test and the Johansen trace test to detect cointegrating relationships between
the variables. Lutkepohl et al. (2001) provide evidence that these two tests may end up
with different results for short samples, which is indeed the case for Belgium in our data
set: according to the maximum eigenvalue test, there is no cointegrating relationship;
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according to the Johansen trace test, we find a maximum of two cointegrating
relationships. For Finland and Australia, both maximum eigenvalue and trace tests
suggest that a maximum of one cointegrating relationship exists. We provide the results
of Johansen trace test in Table 3.1. The table shows that cointegration is strongly rejected
(at significance level 1% ) for other five of the eight countries. Even for the countries
with suspected cointegration vectors, our sample period is not long enough to impose
robust long-run relationships between the variables, the same point noted by Edison and
Slok (2002). 43 Thus we still apply the same structural VAR analysis to these countries.
Furthermore, we run stability tests to see whether the estimated VAR is stable, in
the sense that the variables are covariance stationary. The results show that the
eigenvalue stability condition is satisfied for all countries except Australia. One approach
to address non-stationarity is to difference the data. However, Sims (1980) and Sims et al.
(1990) caution against differencing, as differencing throws away information concerning
the co-movements in the data. Thus we choose not to difference the Australia data before
estimation.
III.III. Empirical Results
We determine the lag structure, namely, the value of K in (2), for each country
based on AIC and FPE criteria. Our examination of the data reveals that the second-order
lag structure is adequate for Australia, Sweden and the UK, that third-order is adequate
for Canada, Finland and Switzerland, and that fourth-order is adequate for Belgium and
the United States.
43

The longest time coverage in our data set is from 1973 to 2009 for the US, whereas the comparable
coverage in Edison and Slok (2002) is from 1990 to 2000. However, ours are quarterly data and theirs are
monthly, therefore our effective sample period is not effectively longer.
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Figure 3.2 and 3.3 depict consumption responses to housing price shocks for the
eight different countries in our data set. The horizontal axis indicates the time that has
passed, in quarters, after a 10% exogenous shock to housing prices initially. The vertical
axis indicates the corresponding changes to consumption in percentages. Dashed and
dotted lines indicate, respectively, 1.645 and one standard deviation confidence bands
(or, 90% and 68% confidence intervals). For all countries except Finland, we observe
that the initial consumption response to a housing price shock (i.e., on impact response) is
positive and statistically significant at a 10% level. Sweden exhibits the largest on impact
consumption response, at 6.42% to a 10% shock, and Finland exhibits the least, at

0.6% which is not statistically significant.
However, housing price has only a transitory effect on consumption, as is
revealed by figure 3.2 and 3.3. Consumption multipliers of housing price shocks level off
over time and decline eventually: for the majority of these countries, after 12 quarters, the
consumption multiplier declines to a value that is less than the response on impact.
Furthermore, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the shape of the impulse-response
function over time: for Canada, the UK, and Sweden it peaks very soon and then trends
down swiftly, whereas for Belgium and Switzerland the trends are visible but almost flat.
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 depict consumption responses to stock market capitalization
shocks for the same countries. The responses on impact for all countries, except Finland,
are positive and statistically significant at a 10% level. Canada leads in the consumption
response on impact at 2.27% to a 10% shock, and Finland again ranks as the last, at a
statistically insignificant 0.15% . Yet, in contrast to the pattern of responses to housing
price shocks, the consumption multipliers of five countries (except the US, Belgium, and
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Switzerland) keep increasing over time. After 8 quarters, all countries have a larger
consumption multiplier than the consumption response on impact. Edison and Slok
(2002, figure 4) also obtain a persistent consumption response to stock valuation shocks
for their selected countries. Their sample includes the US, Canada, the UK, which are
also included in our sample; however, their estimated effects are much smaller in
comparison to ours.
To compare the consumption multipliers to house price shocks with those to stock
market capitalization shocks, we tabulate the two-year impact effects in Table 3.2. The
consumption response is to a 10% initial shock to housing prices, or to stock market
capitalization. Seven countries (Australia excluded) exhibit a larger initial response to
housing price shocks than to stock market capitalization shocks, sometimes substantially
(e.g., 6.42% versus 2.14% in the case of Sweden). 44 By the end of two years, however,
four of these countries display a larger consumption multiplier in response to a stock
market capitalization shock than to a housing price shock.
Could the differences in wealth effects of housing and stocks be attributable to the
use of housing prices instead of home values? We investigate this by replacing household
real estate values with the housing price index for the United States. Figure 3.6
demonstrates the dynamic wealth effects of consumption to housing price shocks by
separately using these two data series for housing wealth. The basic pattern that the
consumption multiplier levels off and eventually falls does not change, yet the

44

Our results for Australia are consistent with the findings in Dvornak and Kohler (2007). Based on statelevel data for Australia, they find that the MPC out of housing wealth (0.02-0.05) is lower than that out of
stock wealth (0.08-0.12).
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consumption multiplier estimated from housing price series drops off more precipitously.
Figure 3.7 shows that the impact on estimates of consumption multipliers to stock value
shocks is minimal when switching to housing value series. 45
After analyzing the wealth effects separately for each country, we are now at a
position where we can gauge the average effects by examining the mean group estimates.
This estimator has been applied in Dvornak and Kohler (2007), Edison and Slok (2002),
Slacalek (2009), to name a few. In essence, it is equivalent to pooling the data and
imposing the identical-slopes restriction for all countries. 46 We show the results in Table
3.3. For all countries as a whole, the initial consumption response to a 10% housing price
shock is 2.79% , in contrast to the (statistically insignificant) 1.31% to a 10% stock
market value shock. Still, by the end of two years, the stock wealth effect overshadows
the housing, consistent with the pattern for the majority of countries observed above,
even though these mean group estimates are not statistically significant after 8 quarters.
We divide the eight countries into two groups: Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia,
Canada, the UK, and the United States) versus Continental Europe countries (Belgium,
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland). The rationale is that the former group has a more
robust housing and stock market system than the latter. From Table 3.3 we observe that
the wealth effects on consumption for the former group are generally greater than those
for the latter group.
45

Likewise, Edison and Slok (2002) find that, by the substitution of stock prices for stock market
capitalization as a measure of wealth for the US, none of their VAR estimates of stock wealth effects
changes.

46

Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that mean group estimators can provide consistent estimates in dynamic
models with heterogeneous coefficients across groups (countries). Strictly speaking, the number of
countries in our sample is small, thus the criteria of large N for applying the mean group estimator is not
satisfied. The results reported below should be treated with caution.
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All the estimates listed so far are expressed in terms of elasticities. It is
straightforward to multiply the elasticity by the consumption-wealth ratio to obtain MPCs
that can be compared with the existing estimates of MPCs in the literature. Since the
housing and stock wealth values are both available only for the US, we select the US to
carry out this exercise. Note that the consumption-wealth ratio itself varies over time. We
choose two different three-year time periods for the calculation of the MPCs: one is from
2003q1 to 2005q1, representative of the booming period for both housing and stock
markets; the other is from 2006q1 to 2008q1, representative of the bust period.
Table 3.4 presents the MPCs calculated for these two time periods. For the boom
years, the computed MPC out of housing wealth is 0.093 in the initial period, which
means for the US a dollar increase in housing prices leads to an immediate 9.3 cents rise
in consumption. This finding compares with a 0.060 MPC out of stock wealth initially.
By the end of two years, the MPC out of housing wealth is 0.24 , whereas the MPC out
of stock wealth is 0.136 . For the bust period, initially, the housing and stock wealth
MPCs are both lower than those in the boom years ( 0.08 and 0.051 now). Yet because
of the decline in both housing and stock wealth values and the fact that consumption
cannot decline indefinitely, by the end of two years, the MPCs become substantially
greater those in the boom period. The initial MPCs for housing and/or stock wealth are
within the range of those reported in the literature for the US (Benjamin et al. 2004;
Cardarelli et al. 2008; Slacalek, 2009). 47 Nevertheless, the crucial additional insight from
our study is that the two-year MPCs turn out to be much greater due to the dynamic

47

Our estimated initial MPCs of housing and stock wealth are close to the “eventual” MPCs obtained in
Carroll et al. (2011), whose approach exploits the sluggishness in consumption response to shocks.
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effects of one variable on the others. In particular, this finding of continuing stock wealth
effects boosting consumption for a few quarters is consistent with that in Dynan and
Maki (2001), who use Consumer Expenditure Survey micro data in their analysis. Our
estimated magnitude also agrees with what they obtain.
Empirically teasing out the causes behind the differences in housing and stock
wealth effects is a difficult task. Here we just navigate on one key difference between
housing and stock assets: housing assets can be used for collateralized borrowing, while it
is less common for households to post stock shares to borrow. We explore the
relationship between estimated housing wealth effects and country values of Mortgage
Market Index (MMI) constructed by Cardarelli et al. (2008). Mortgage Market Index is
constructed from a variety of indicators, including mortgage equity withdrawal,
refinancing easiness, typical loan-to-value ratio, mortgage-backed security issues, et
cetera, and measures the maturity and development of mortgage market of a country. A
higher value of MMI indicates easier household access to mortgage credit. Table 3.2 lists
the values of MMI for our sample of countries except Switzerland, for which the data is
not available. Figure 3.9 plots the on impact, 1-year, and 2-year consumption elasticities
to a 10% housing price shock against the Mortgage Market Index constructed by
Cardarelli et al. (2008). The trendlines of these scatter plots visualize the fact that those
countries with higher MMIs are associated with greater housing wealth effects.
III.IV. Conclusion
This paper employs the structural VAR model to analyze the relationship
between consumption, income, and stock and housing wealth. We apply this model to
time series data of eight developed countries. Our main finding is that for a majority of
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countries in our data housing wealth exerts a larger and statistically significant response
of consumption on impact than stock wealth does, yet the long-run effects of a housing
wealth shock are not as persistent as those of a stock capitalization shock. For the US, our
estimates imply an immediate MPC of 8-9 cents out of a dollar increase in housing
wealth, in contrast to a MPC of 5-6 cents for stock wealth. Our identification strategy is
based on the particular Cholesky recursive ordering but our results are robust to other
orderings as well.
Because of data availability, we can only use housing prices as a proxy for house
values. For the US, however, we do have data for both housing prices and household
owned real estate values, and we find that our results are not sensitive to which measure
in use. We find a larger housing wealth effect is associated with easier access to mortgage
credit for these countries.
Our finding that the stock wealth effect is more persistent than the housing wealth
effect probably stands in contrary to conventional wisdom. It is unclear how we can
generalize this finding, however, since there are only eight countries in our sample.
Nevertheless, the results are firm and robust for the US and they suggest important public
policy implications. Existing studies that have obtained a higher, immediate MPC of
housing markets would hint paying close attention to possible policy effects to housing
markets rather than to equity markets. However, based on our study, a buoyant stock
market, even though its immediate impact on the economy through consumption boosting
is weaker, would make its economic contributions persistently over time.
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Table 3.1. Results of Johansen trace tests for eight countries
Country
Australia
Belgium

Canada
Finland
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US (housing price)
US (housing value

Johansen trace test
Trace Statistic
1% Critical
Maximum Rank
73.21

54.46

30.6
63.61

35.65
54.46

36.27
17.27
52.18
71.38
26.43
50.72
47.64

35.65
20.04
54.46
54.46
35.65
54.46
54.46

1
2*
0*
0

51.8
47.77
37

54.46
54.46
54.46

0*
0*
0*

0
1*
0

1*
0*
0*

Notes : “*” by the ma xi mum ra nk i ndi ca tes tha t thi s i s the va l ue of ra nk
s el ected by Joha ns en’s mul ti pl e-tra ce tes t procedure.

Table 3.2. The dynamic percentage change of consumption to a 10% shock to housing
prices and to stock market capitalization

Consumption response to a 10%
house price shcok
stock market value shock
(a)
Mortgage market index Initial
Country
1-year 2-year
Initial
1-year 2-year
Australia
0.69
1.38%** 2.47%** 1.42%
1.45%** 3.43%** 3.66%**
Canada
0.57
2.93%** 4.00%** 1.19%
2.27%** 3.86%** 2.84%*
UK
0.58
5.37%** 5.81%** 3.45%** 1.46%** 1.70%* 2.17%*
US (housing price)
2.35%** 5.09%** 5.37%** 0.94%** 2.1%** 3.04%**
0.98
US (housing value)
2.18%** 5.22%** 6.58%** 1.26%** 2.55%** 3.21%*
Belgium
0.34
1.54%** 3.36%** 3.40%** 0.50%* 1.11%* 3.90%**
Finland
0.49
0.60%
-0.83% -2.79%* 0.15%
1.85%* 3.20%*
Sweden
0.66
6.42%** 9.00%** 7.33%* 2.14%** 3.98%** 3.77%*
Switzerland
—
1.75%** 2.17%** 1.89%* 1.58%** 2.31%** 2.43%**
Notes : Cons umpti on percenta ge cha nge i n res pons e to a 10% exogenous s hock to hous i ng pri ces a nd to s tock ma rket
ca pi ta l i za ti on for ea ch country. Al l ca l cul a ti ons a re ba s ed upon the i mpul s e-res pons e functi ons i mpl i ed by our
SVAR es ti ma tes . Ini ti a l el a s ti ci ty i s the el a s ti ci ty i n the i ni ti a l peri od. ** a nd * i ndi ca te s ta ti s ti ca l s i gni fi ca nce
l evel s of 0.1 a nd 0.32, res pecti vel y. (a ) Mortga ge ma rket i ndex i s a n i ndex of the ma turi ty a nd devel opment of
mortga ge ma rket of a country (hi gher va l ue i ndi ca ti ng ea s i er hous ehol d a cces s to mortga ge credi t), cons tructed from
i ndi ca tors of mortga ge equi ty wi thdra wa l , refi na nci ng ea s i nes s , typi ca l l oa n-to-va l ue ra ti o, mortga ge-ba cked
s ecuri ty i s s ues , et cetera . See Ca rda rel l i et a l . (2008) for further deta i l .
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Table 3.3. The mean group estimators of consumption to a 10% shock to housing prices
and to stock market capitalization
Consumption response to a 10%
house price shock
stock market value shock
Region
Initial
1-year
2-year
Initial
1-year 2-year
Anglo-Saxon countrie 3.01%*** 4.34%*
2.86%
1.53%* 2.77%* 2.93%
Continental Europe 2.58%*
3.43%*
2.46%
1.09%
2.31%
3.33%
All
2.79%*
3.88%
2.66%
1.31%
2.54%
3.13%
Notes : Cons umpti on percenta ge cha nge i n res pons e to a 10% exogenous s hock to hous i ng
pri ces a nd to s tock ma rket ca pi ta l i za ti on for ea ch regi on. Reported here a re the unwei ghted
mea n group es ti ma tors for ea ch regi on. The s ta nda rd error of ea ch mea n group es ti ma tor i s
ca l cul a ted a s s umi ng the es ti ma tes for ea ch country a re i ndependent. Al l ca l cul a ti ons a re
ba s ed upon the i mpul s e-res pons e functi ons i mpl i ed by our VAR es ti ma tes . Ini ti a l el a s ti ci ty
i s the el a s ti ci ty i n the i ni ti a l peri od. ***, ** a nd * i ndi ca te s ta ti s ti ca l s i gni fi ca nce l evel s of
0.05, 0.1 a nd 0.32, res pecti vel y. Angl o-Sa xon Countri es i ncl ude Aus tra l i a , Ca na da , UK, a nd US;
Conti nenta l Europe countri es i ncl ude Bel gi um, Fi nl a nd, Sweden, a nd Swi tzerl a nd.

Table 3.4. The Marginal Propensity to Consume for the United States
U.S. Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) of
starting period
2003q1
2007q1

housing wealth
Initial
1-year 2-year
0.093
0.209
0.240
0.080
0.224
0.345

stock wealth
Initial 1-year 2-year
0.060 0.112
0.136
0.051 0.107
0.214

Notes : MPC i s ca l cul a ted a s the el a s ti ci ty of cons umpti on to wea l th mul ti pl i ed by cons umpti onwea l th ra ti o of the corres pondi ng peri od. The el a s ti ci ti es a re obta i ned from the i mpul s eres pons e functi ons i mpl i ed by our SVAR es ti ma tes . We choos e U.S. beca us e i t ha s both
hous ehol d hous e va l ue a nd s tock ma rket ca pi ta l i za ti on va l ue i n da ta .

Table 3.5. Summary period of coverage and number of observations for countries
Country
Period of coverageNumber of observations
1986q3—2004q4
74
Australia
Belgium
1981q1—2004q4
96
Canada
1981q1—2009q4
116
Finland
1988q2—2004q4
67
Sweden
1986q1—2004q4
76
Switzerland
1981q1—2003q4
92
United Kingdom 1984q2—2004q4
83
United States
1973q1—2009q4
148
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Figure 3.1. Housing price and stock market index: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom,
United States

Australia

Canada

UK

US

Notes: index = 100 for both housing price and stock market capitalization at the
beginning of data time series for each country. For the United States, the series of market
value of household owned real estate is also included.
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Figure 3.2. Housing price and stock market index: Belgium, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland

Belgium

Finland

Sweden

Switzerland

Notes: index = 100 for both housing price and stock market capitalization at the
beginning of data time series for each country. For the United States, the series of market
value of household owned real estate is also included.
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Figure 3.3. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing
prices: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States

Australia

Canada

UK

US

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing
prices: Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland

Belgium

Finland

Sweden

Switzerland

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.5. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock
market capitalization: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States

Australia

Canada

UK

US

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.6. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock
market capitalization: Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland

Belgium

Finland

Sweden

Switzerland

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.7. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing
value or housing price: United States

US (estimated with housing price index)

US (estimated with housing value)

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.

Figure 3.8. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock
market capitalization: United States

US (estimated with housing price index)

US (estimated with housing value)

Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.9. Scatter Plots of consumption responses to a 10% housing price stock
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APPENDIX
Derivatives
The derivates in (24)-(28) are as follows:

q1* =

(ε − tl )

θ

2
g

> 0, q2* = −

1

θg

<0

(30)

θ g k1*
r (ε − tl )
rθ r (ε − tl )
rθ r
*
> 0, k 4* =
> 0, (31)
< 0, k 2 =
< 0, k3* =
k =
2
θc
− θ cθ g f ′′(k )
− θ cθ g f ′′(k )
θ cθ g f ′′(k )
*
1

b1* = −


f ′(k )k1*
f ′(k )k 2*
f ′(k )k3* 
f ′(k )k 4*
*
> 0, b2* = −
> 0, b3* = − c +
b
<
0,
=
, (32)

4
r
r
r
r


'

c* = r c
'

(33)

 1 

φ * = − 2 
 rθ r 

(34)

On the other hand, plugging adjustment cost equation into equation (20) and
manipulating the obtained one will yield:
 θ g (q − q) 

it = kt 
 χθ c 



(35)

Finally,


∞
1
q0 = Et ∑
rθ r
t =0
1+
θg


t



 θ c  f ' (k ) − r (1 − ε ) + ( it +1 ) 2 T ' ( it +1 ) 
t +1


 θ 
kt +1  
 kt +1
 g
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(36)



1
if capital gains tax rate decreases, 
 rθ r
1+
θg


t



 will increase which means an increase in




qo . On the other hand, qo will decline becaues of the decrease in

θc
. Thus, we can
θg

conclude that the latter impact dominates the former.
Once the adjustment cost equation is plugged into equation (20), after some
manipulation, we will end up with the following:
it θ g qt − ε + tl
=
χθ c
kt

(37)

As investment tax credit declines, tl , investment level will decrease. Yet, on the
other hand, the increase in q will stimulate investment. From figure (I.21), one can infer
that the impacts of the decrease in tl dominates the effects of the decrease in q on
investment level in the short-run. However, it should be noted that the shock is temporary
and dies out over time. Thus, after a certain point, the change in q outweighs by giving
rise to an increase in investment as seen in figure.
Calibrating Parameters
To calibrate the model, we choose the parameters in conformance to the best
practice in the literature, so that we have following initial values:

r = 0.04 , α = 0.33 , ρ = 0.9, µ = 0.9 , w = 0.8 , χ = 2.9 .
On the other hand, the country specific tax rate data is obtained from OECD Tax
Data Base.
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